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1CONSERVADURISMO DEL RESULTADO BAJO LAS 
NORMAS INTERNACIONALES DE CONTABILIDAD: 
UN ESTUDIO COMPARADO
Resumen
El presente trabajo muestra que la adopción de la normativa del IASB en los países 
europeos ha contribuido a aumentar el conservadurismo del resultado de las empresas 
que las implantaron antes de ser obligatorias en 2005, acercando las medidas de 
conservadurismo a los niveles estadounidenses. Este no es el caso de las empresas 
de países menos desarrollados que han adoptado la normativa internacional. Para 
estas empresas, pese a la adopción de las NIC, el conservadurismo no ha aumentado. 
De hecho, no hay indicios de asimetría en el reconocimiento de noticias en el
resultado. Además, parte del aumento en el conservadurismo observado en las
empresas europeas desaparece si se controla de manera adecuada por sus
características específicas.
21. INTRODUCCIÓN
En este trabajo contrastamos si la adopción de las normas de contabilidad emitidas 
por el IASB (IAS) afecta de manera significativa al conservadurismo del resultado, 
entendido como la mayor oportunidad en el reflejo de pérdidas que en el
reconocimiento de beneficios. Ball et al. (2000), Ball et al. (2003), García Lara et al.
(2005) y Bushman y Piotroski (2006), entre otros, argumentan que las diferencias en el 
conservadurismo del resultado entre países son atribuibles a diferencias en los 
factores institucionales propios de cada entorno (como, por ejemplo, el riesgo de litigio 
asumido por directivos y auditores), y que el empleo de un único conjunto de normas 
no contribuirá a reducir las diferencias en las propiedades del resultado si las 
diferencias entre tales factores permanecen. En el actual contexto de normalización 
contable a escala global, Ball et al. (2003) concluyen que la adopción de normas 
contables de alta calidad no garantiza por si misma la publicación de una información
financiera de calidad si ello no se acompaña de los oportunos mecanismos de control.
En el contexto europeo, y a escala global, el éxito en la implantación de las IAS 
dependerá fundamentalmente de su efecto final sobre las cualidades de la información
financiera publicada por las empresas, en términos de comparabilidad, relevancia y 
fiabilidad. En este trabajo analizamos si tales normas son capaces de mejorar el 
conservadurismo del resultado, como propiedad o atributo de la información financiera
que muestra una mayor variación entre diferentes países o entornos institucionales. En 
concreto, analizamos si las diferencias en la oportunidad asimétrica del resultado en 
58 países, comparando el conservadurismo del resultado publicado bajo las normas 
nacionales e internacionales de contabilidad. 
La evidencia hallada muestra que, en línea con la evidencia previa, el
conservadurismo del resultado es significativamente más pronunciado en los países 
con sistemas legales basados en el derecho común, frente a los países con tradición 
legislativa inspirada en el derecho romano. Por otra parte, la adopción de las IAS ha 
contribuido a mejorar de manera significativa la prudencia o conservadurismo del
resultado en los países europeos, pero no ha sido así en otros países caracterizados 
como emergentes o en vías de desarrollo.
La segunda parte de nuestro estudio se centra en Alemania, con objeto de controlar el 
efecto de los factores institucionales en el país donde es mayor el número de
empresas que vienen aplicando las IAS-IFRS. Para ello, construimos dos muestras de 
empresas que utilizan las normas nacionales e internacionales, comparables en
términos de sector económico y tamaño en cada año. En relación con ambas
muestras, no se aprecia una diferencia significativa en el conservadurismo del
resultado.
En conjunto, la evidencia hallada sugiere que la normalización contable basada en la 
adopción de un mismo sistema de normas contables en distintos países no es 
suficiente para conseguir la homogeneidad en las propiedades del resultado publicado. 
Más bien, ello exigiría eliminar las diferencias en los factores institucionales propios de 
cada entorno. Estos factores son, en última instancia, los que condicionan los
incentivos de los responsables de elaborar (y auditar) la información financiera para 
optar por prácticas más o menos conservadoras en el reconocimiento de pérdidas y 
beneficios. De hecho, los resultados obtenidos con referencia a las empresas
europeas, apuntan que la utilización de las IAS en cada país tiende a mejorar la 
prudencia del resultado, pero esta mejora no es evidente con respecto a las empresas 
de similares características económicas.
3El resto del trabajo se organiza en cuatro secciones. La sección segunda analiza las 
razones que justifican la normalización contable basada en la adopción de las IAS, y 
expone su efecto esperado sobre el conservadurismo del resultado. En la sección 
tercera se describen las hipótesis y el diseño de la investigación. Por último, los 
aspectos más relevantes del trabajo se resumen en la sección quinta a modo de 
conclusión.
2. INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION OF IASB STANDARDS AND ITS EFFECTS OVER 
CONSERVATISM IN EARNINGS
The implementation of the IAS in different countries responds to different regulatory 
incentives. In the European Union, IAS are compulsory for listed firms, to prepare their 
consolidated financial statements, from 2005 onwards. In the EU case, the adoption of 
the international standards responds to the interest of the European Commission of 
improving the comparability of accounting information in Europe. The comparability of 
accounting information is a basic requisite to improve the allocation of rents among 
competing firms/projects and to improve the efficiency of the internal financial markets. 
While in the EU comparability is the main objective of introducing international
standards, in developing economies the basic interest of using IASB standards is to 
ensure a certain degree of quality of the information provided, both in terms of
relevance and reliability. In both cases, EU and developing countries, another incentive 
to adopt the IAS relates to the fact that the SEC (Securities and Exchange
Commission, the financial market regulatory body in the US and a member of IOSCO) 
was expected to accept IASB-compliant financial statements for the purpose of cross-
listing in US financial markets.
Looking at the European case, prior evidence suggests that some of the differences in 
the properties of accounting numbers across European countries are attributable to 
differential institutional settings that give managers different incentives to reflect in a 
different way the same economic events in the financial statements. This is especially 
relevant in the case of conservatism. Differences in the ownership structure, litigation
exposure of managers and auditors, shareholder protection mechanisms, etc… lead to 
pronounced differences in earnings conservatism across countries that the use of a 
single set of standards will not be able to eliminate if the differences in the institutional 
context remain and managers’ incentives continue to differ.
As earnings conservatism has been pointed out as one of the main source of
differences in the properties of earnings across countries, in this study we focus on 
whether differences in earnings conservatism exist across firms using their own local 
GAAP or using the IAS.
2.1. Conservatism in earnings
Conservatism in earnings is a temporary question, and does not imply understating 
earnings consistently, as the very same accrual principle would prevent this. Basu 
(1997) defines conservatism in earnings as the asymmetric treatment of gains and 
losses in the profit and loss account. Losses are recognised on a timelier basis than 
gains. As Givoly and Hayn (2000) point out, conservatism in the profit and loss account 
is a question of the timing and sequencing of earnings relative to their associated cash-
flows. They argue that, under a steady state, and over a sufficiently long period,
accounting based measures of performance will converge to the true economic 
performance. This argument is similar to the error-cancelling argument in Zhang
(2000), where he shows that if there is no growth, accounting earnings asymptotically 
4equal economic earnings i. Even assuming growth, conservatism in earnings will only 
affect (decrease) the book value of shareholders’ equity temporarily (the lags described 
in Beaver and Ryan, 2000), until the reversal of the accruals.
2.2. Effects of the adoption of IASB standards over conservatism in earnings
As pointed out in the IASB’s conceptual framework (IASC, 1989), the objective of
financial statements is to provide information about the financial position, performance 
and about the changes in the financial position of an enterprise that is useful to a wide 
range of decision makers in making economic decisions. The IASB’s framework
describes four qualitative characteristics that accounting information should have to be 
useful to this wide range of users (investors, lenders, employees, government, etc.): i) 
understandability, ii) relevance, iii) reliability and iv) comparability.
While most developed countries (all EU countries) have accounting systems based on 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles similar to the ones stated by the IASB, which 
lead to relevant and reliable information, firms in developing countries have shifted 
towards IAS in an attempt to improve the quality of their accounting information. As we 
already pointed out, the objective of EU countries with the adoption of the IASB
standards is to improve comparability. Either in developing countries, or in the
European Union, one might expect that given that IAS are closer to common-law
countries’ accounting standards, the adoption of IAS would lead to accounting earnings 
characteristics, like conservatism, being closer to common-law earnings. However, 
analysing prior literature (for example, García Lara et al., 2005 for European countries 
or Ball et al., 2003 for Asian countries) the expectation could be that given that
differences in the institutional context do not change and that enforcement (especially 
in Asian countries) is low, the properties of earnings will not change by using IAS.
Looking at the European Union case, the use of 25 different accounting standards was 
an obvious barrier to the comparability of accounting information, making it difficult to 
allocate capital in an efficient way among EU firms. Most local investors used to invest 
in local firms just because they knew their accounting standards. This situation was 
undermining the efficiency of the allocation of economic resources and was
constraining the range of investment choices of EU citizens. However, prior literature 
that analyses the international differences in earnings conservatism points out that 
differences will not disappear just using a set of common standards, as the differences 
arise because of the different institutional settings. Most of this literature compares 
common-law accounting regimes (Anglo-Saxon regimes: US, UK, Ireland) with code-
law based countries (all European continental countries ii).
The different role of financial statements in countries with common-law and code-law
accounting systems lead to international differences in conservatism (See Ball et al.,
2000). In common-law countries (typical examples are the US and the UK), the
ownership of the firm is very widespread, and firms seek capital funds directly from 
small investors through the capital markets. Investors in these countries demand very 
informative accounting information, and financial statements are the only source of 
information about the financial affairs of the firm that most of these small investors 
have. This demand for information is especially important for investors in the case of 
bad news, as we can assume that they are risk averse. Investors will be willing and 
able to sue managers and auditors if they fail to disclose bad news on a very timely 
basis. This enhances the asymmetry in the recognition of good and bad news that the 
accounting system, per se, already has.
5This demand for an asymmetric recognition of good and bad news in earnings 
(earnings conservatism) is not so important in code-law based countries. In code-law
based countries the main providers of capital funds (even through the capital markets) 
are financial institutions. These financial institutions have other timelier sources of 
information about the firm than financial statements. They are even represented in the 
board of directors. Consequently, the demand for earnings conservatism in these
countries is lower than in common-law based countries. Banks in code-law based 
countries demand conservative valuation of assets (balance sheet conservatism), and 
this more pronounced balance sheet conservative behaviour leads to less asymmetry 
in the recognition of good and bad news in earnings, that is, to less pronounced 
earnings conservatism practices (see Pope and Walker, 2003; and Beaver and Ryan, 
2005). Other institutional features, for example, the demand for smoothed income
streams (see Ball et al., 2000; and Bao and Bao, 2004) will also contribute to less 
pronounced earnings conservatism in code-law based countries.
Consistent with this explanation of the difference in the demand for earnings
conservatism across code and common-law based countries, Ball et al. (2000) and 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) find the US more conservative than code-law based 
countries. In Europe, García Lara et al. (2005) show that the UK is more conservative 
from a profit and loss account perspective than France and Germany (typical code-law
based countries). They show that prior findings of similar levels of earnings
conservatism between the UK and European code-law based countries are severely 
influenced by earnings management practices in Continental European countries.
Bearing in mind this more pronounced earnings conservatism in common-law countries 
found in prior literature (Ball et al., 2000; García Lara et al., 2005, Bushman and 
Piotroski, 2006), one might think that by using IASB standards, which are closer to 
common-law countries’ standards (closer to US or UK GAAP), earnings conservatism 
should increase in code-law based European firms. However, the factors explaining 
why code-law based firms are more conservative in earnings than common-law based 
firms relate directly to institutional features in each country (litigation risk, smoothing of 
earnings due to taxation and dividend policy), and this will not change by using a 
common set of accounting standards.
Our main objective is, thus, analysing whether the use of the IAS will have an effect 
over earnings conservatism of adopting firms, or if the institutional factors will dominate 
and determine the properties of earnings regardless of the set of standards that firms 
use. Our results are consistent with the latter explanation: earnings conservatism is not 
largely influenced by the regulatory change.
3. RESEARCH DESIGN
Given the effects that the use of the IASB standards could have over the properties of 
earnings in general and over earnings conservatism in particular, we test the following 
two hypotheses:
H1: Effects of IAS implementation in countries with low quality local standards (for 
example East Asian countries) vs effects of IAS implementation in countries with high 
quality local standards (for example continental European countries).
Given the low relevance and reliability of accounting information from developing
countries, for example, East-Asian countries, the use of the IAS by firms in these 
countries is expected to contribute to make their accounting information more similar to 
the one reported by firms in common-law countries. When analysing conservatism, this 
6expectation of increased quality in earnings numbers by using IASB standards should 
translate into more conservative accounting numbers, that is, a more pronounced
asymmetry in earnings caused by bad news being recognised in a timelier basis. 
However, and as pointed out by Ball et al. (2003), the absence of enforcement
mechanisms, together with the use of different and ad-hoc versions of the IAS, lead to 
a decrease in the relevance and reliability of accounting numbers in these countries, 
which would be making accounting information not timely at all. On the other hand, in 
countries where a set of high quality accounting standards exist, the use of IAS is 
expected to maintain a high level of earnings conservatism. This is the case of
continental European countries, where earnings conservatism is even expected to
increase (from a regulatory point of view) given that most continental European
accounting regulations are more conservative from a balance sheet perspective,
forcing earnings conservatism measures downwards (see an analysis of the relation 
between earnings and balance sheet conservatism in Pope and Walker, 2003, and 
Beaver and Ryan, 2005).
To test this hypothesis we just compare samples of firms using and not using IAS, 
coming from several country sets: i) common-law countries, ii) code-law countries, iii) 
European code-law countries, iv) emerging countries, v) firms using IA worldwide, and 
vi) firms using IAS in Europe. The objective is to see whether there are significant 
differences in conservatism across the different country sets. We are aware that these 
sets of countries/firms are very heterogeneous, and that the results are obviously
affected by differences in the sample composition. However, we take this analysis as 
just a description of differences between accounting regimes, and in the next set of 
analyses, we run a more formal set of tests to see the impact of the use of the IASB 
standards in one country (Germany), using two samples of firms, matched by economic 
characteristics, that use respectively IAS and local GAAP, and see whether the use of 
different standards for similar firms affect their accounting numbers.
H2: Impact of IAS use in German firms (a matched sample analysis).
Given that the differences across European code-law and common-law countries in 
earnings attributes in general, and in earnings conservatism in particular, are
attributable to differences in the institutional context (i.e. differences in ownership 
structure, litigation risk and earnings management incentives), we expect that even 
using the international accounting standards, earnings conservatism will not be
significantly affected by the use of IAS, and its level will be similar between firms using 
local GAAP and firms using IAS.
If we focus on the changes that the IASB standards introduce in conservative
accounting choices, the IASB standards are in general less balance sheet conservative 
than local European continental standards. For example, IAS 16 permits the use of fair 
value accounting for tangible assets, consequently allowing the use of revaluations for 
assets. However, German GAAP does not allow the use of revaluations at all. This 
means that German GAAP is more balance sheet conservative, leading to an under-
recognition and understatement of assets that translates into lower measures of
earnings conservatism (see Beaver and Ryan, 2005). In this situation, the first order 
regulatory effect of using IAS would lead to increased measures of earnings
conservatism.
However, and as pointed out by Ball et al. (2000), the differences in earnings
conservatism between common-law countries and European continental countries are 
due to differences in the institutional context. Litigation risk is one of main triggers of 
earnings conservatism in common-law countries. However, litigation risk is practically 
inexistent in Germany (as in other European continental countries): the main providers 
7of finance have timelier sources of information about the firm other than the financial 
statements, and in addition, even if investors would be willing to sue managers or 
auditors, the mechanisms in place for shareholder protection would probably lead to a 
costly and unsuccessful judicial process. Also, Ball et al. (2000) explain the difference 
between German firms and common-law firms in the timelier recognition of bad news in 
earnings looking at smoothing. Earnings smoothing is much more pronounced in
Germany than in common-law countries (see also Leuz et al., 2003; Bao and Bao, 
2004; Gassen et al., 2005; García Lara et al., 2006). In civil-law based countries, like 
Germany, ownership is very concentrated, even in listed firms. Banks hold large direct 
or indirect ownership blocks and dominate voting rights. Ball et al. (2000) argue that 
bank leverage regulations penalise volatility in bank income. Consequently, banks have 
incentives to reduce the volatility of earnings streams from their investments, and as 
they are represented in the board of directors they pressure their participated firms for 
smooth streams of earnings and dividends. At the same time, the tax authorities 
pressure both firms and financial institutions to reduce the volatility of earnings to 
reduce the volatility of tax receipts. Related to this, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 
(2005) argue that smoothing of earnings in Germany will increase with the
implementation of the IASB standards.
These differential institutional factors (absence of litigation risk, more pronounced
smoothing of earnings) will not disappear with the implementation of the IASB
standards, and as they are the main drivers of the earnings conservatism, we expect 
that the level of earnings conservatism will be similar in German firms using local 
GAAP and IASB standards iii.
The sample
The initial sample (‘IAS sample’) to test our first set of analyses consists of 874 firms 
from 58 countries that adopted voluntarily the IASB standards for financial reporting 
purposes over the period 1994-2003. The sample is drawn from Compustat Global,
and we identify whether the firm is using IAS through the variable “standard note”. For 
comparative purposes, we also use a sample of firms from 20 developed or emerging 
countries, which used domestic GAAP during the same period, with a total of 12,057
firms, and 79,052 firm-year observations. We will compare the earnings attributes of 
firms using IAS with the earnings attributes of groups of firms from common-law, code-
law and emerging countries. Table 1 provides a description of the sample composition
per country, and Table 2 provides sample descriptive statistics. We group firms 
according to whether they are domiciled in a common-law, code-law or emerging 
country, and according to whether the firm uses IAS or local GAAP. The descriptive 
statistics are consistent with the existence of earnings conservatism in all groups of 
firms, that is, earnings is negatively skewed in all groups (medians exceed means). 
Also, we can see that the standard deviation of returns is always larger than the 
standard deviation of earnings, consistent with the intrinsic characteristics of
accounting numbers, less affected by news. These descriptive statistics are consistent 
with prior research.
Regarding our second set of tests, where we concentrate on Germany and use a 
matched sample of firms using IASB standards and local GAAP, we download all 
available observations for German firms in Compustat Global for the period 1994-
2004iv . We exclude financial firms, and firms with missing data to estimate the different 
conservatism models. We identify firms using local GAAP and IASB standards using 
the “standard note” variable. We match every observation from the sample of German 
firms using IASB standards with an observation of the sample of German firms using 
local GAAP. To do the matching we select, for any given firm-year observation using 
8IAS all observations from the local-GAAP sample from the same year and US-SIC 2 
digit codev , and then we choose as a match the one that minimises the difference in 
total assets. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics from this sample. Again consistent 
with prior research, earnings is negative skewed in both samples and returns are more 
volatile than earnings.
Conservatism tests
To measure the level of earnings conservatism we use stock returns as a proxy for 
news, and estimate the model proposed by Basu (1997):
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where: X is earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the fiscal 
year t, R is the rate of return (inclusive of dividends) over the fiscal year t, and RD is a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 in case of bad news (negative or zero rate of 
return), and 0 otherwise. We use different definitions of earnings (before and after 
extraordinary and special items); and returns (measured using a 12 month window over 
the fiscal year, over a 12 month window finishing 3 months after the balance sheet 
date, and using 15 month windows covering the fiscal year plus 3 months).
For our first set of tests, we estimate equation [1] for each accounting system from a 
pooled cross-section (across firms) and time-series (fiscal years) regression. The 
coefficient β2 measures the average contemporaneous sensitivity of accounting
earnings reported by firms in each group to positive changes in market value of equity
(economic gains). The coefficient β3 measures the incremental response of accounting 
earnings to negative changes in market value of equity (economic losses). The total 
response or sensitivity of accounting earnings to negative changes in market value of 
equity is measured by (β2+β3). Following Giner and Rees (2001), we estimate whether 
the conservatism coefficient (β3) is significantly different across the different groups as:
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where θi is the estimated coefficient and si the standard error for variable i.
For our second set of tests, we apply model 1 to the two matched samples of German 
firms using local GAAP and IASB standards, and analyse whether differences between 
the two groups are significant using the test described in equation [2].
4. RESULTS
Table 4 presents the results of running Equation [1] for six different groups: 
(i) Firms in common-law countries using their own local GAAP (Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States).
(ii) Firms in code-law countries using their own local GAAP (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain and Switzerland)v i.
(iii) As in (ii) but excluding Japan. That is, only European code-law firms.
(iv) Firms in emerging countries using local GAAP (Hong Kong, Malaysia,
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand).
(v) All firms using IAS identified in Compustat Global (58 countries).
(vi) Firms using IAS in our European main sample (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and Switzerland).
9The results show that for the common-law group (group i) results are consistent with 
prior research. Conservatism exists -earnings are clearly asymmetric, β3 equals 0.30-
and the good news coefficient (β2) is close to zero.vii The intercept is positive and 
significant, showing the effect of prior period good news. If we focus on the code-law
group (ii), we see that results are dominated by Japanese firms. As in Ball et al. (2000) 
Japan is much less conservative than common-law countries. In our sample, the 
conservatism coefficient β3 for the code-law sample including Japan is 0.08, and the 
difference with the β3 coefficient from common-law countries is significantly different (t-
stat: 20.55). If we drop Japan from the code-law sample (group iii), we see that the β3
coefficient rises to 0.24. This is consistent with prior evidence on European countries 
(Giner and Rees, 2001, García Lara and Mora, 2004, Bushman and Piotroski, 2006), 
but we should note that the difference with the common-law firms is still significant (t-
stat 2.93). García Lara et al. (2005) argue that the measures of conservatism in 
European code-law based countries are inflated due to earnings management
practices that purposefully decrease earnings for tax and dividend policy reasons. For 
the two code-law samples the good news coefficient is positive and close to zero, and 
the intercepts are significant.
Looking at the emerging countries using their own local GAAP (sample iv), the results 
show that these firms are also significantly (t-stat 6.40) less conservative than firms in 
common-law based countries. The very low coefficient of determination may also be 
pointing at a very low relevance of accounting numbers in these countries, which is 
consistent with the results in Ball et al. (2003).
Finally, with regards to the two IAS samples, sample (v) for all countries, and sample 
(vii) for European countries, we find the following. When we use all firms using IASB 
standards, results are difficult to interpret due to the tremendous firm heterogeneity, 
although given that we find a significant β3 coefficient we might think that the lack of 
enforcement in most countries does not lead to low relevance and low reliability of 
accounting information. If we focus on European firms using IAS the interpretation is 
much clearer. We observe a significant increase in the β3 coefficient (t-stat: 4.50) with 
respect to firms from the same seven countries using local GAAP. This increase could 
be attributable to IASB standards (IAS 16) being less balance sheet conservative than 
local European continental GAAPs and, consequently, leading to more conservative 
earnings numbers (see Beaver and Ryan, 2005). Also, European firms using IAS might 
be listed in other markets, more widely held, and subject to pressures other than those 
from the European continental institutional context (see Raonic et al. 2004).
In addition, we test if the conservative measures derived from model [1] for the IAS 
sample are significantly different before and after the adoption of the IAS, by running 
the following regression:
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where DIit = 1 when accounting earnings of firm i in fiscal year t is reported under IAS, 
and DIit = 0 when domestic GAAP were used. Model [3] is separately estimated over 
the IAS subsample formed by retaining firms from the seven continental European 
(code-law) countries, and over the IAS subsample that puts together firms from the rest 
of the world. Table 5 displays the results obtained. While for the European sample we 
observe that the β3D coefficient of 0.17 (t=2.78) confirms a significant increase in the 
contemporaneous earnings response to bad news when the IASB standards are
adopted, when we look at firms from other countries we see that the β3D coefficient is 
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not significant. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the adoption of IAS in non-
European (code-law based) countries over our sample period implied a significant 
increase in earnings conservatism.
To avoid our results being driven by differences in the sample composition in each 
group, and to study more deeply the effect of the use of IASB standards on
conservatism, in our next set of analyses we focus on Germany and match firms using 
local GAAP and IASB standards by industry and size, and analyse whether there are 
significant differences between the two groups. We choose Germany as it is the only 
country where, given the sample size, we can undertake this analysis.
Table 6 shows the results of this analysis. We can see that the earnings conservatism 
coefficient (β3) for firms using local GAAP is 0.27 (income before extraordinary items), 
and 0.32 for firms using IAS. As expected, the effect of the use of IASB standards 
should contribute to an increase in earnings conservatism. However, and due to the 
existence of institutional features in Germany that predetermine conservatism, we 
expect that the effect of IASB standards would be very limited. The difference between 
the local GAAP group and the IASB group is not significant (t-stat: 0.46), consistent 
with institutional factors shaping earnings attributes regardless of the set of standards 
used by the firms. The inferences do not change when we use earnings after
extraordinary items, as the difference between the two groups in the β3 coefficient is 
still not significant (t-stat: 0.86). 
To confirm the robustness of this result we run model [3] for the matched samples of 
German firms using local GAAP and the IAS. Running this model we check whether 
the total bad news effect in earnings of local GAAP firms (β2 + β3) significantly differs 
from the total bad news effect in earnings of IASB firms (β2 + β2D + β3 + β3D). With the 
results in Table 7 we cannot reject the hypothesis that (β2 + β3) = (β2 + β2D + β3 + β3D).
That is, there is no significant difference in earnings conservatism between the
matched samples of firms using German local GAAP and IASB standards.
Sensitivity tests
To ensure the robustness of our results we replicate our main results using different 
definitions of returns. In our main tests we calculate returns over the fiscal year. We 
also calculate them over a 12-month-window finishing 3 months after the fiscal year 
end, and over a 15 month window finishing 3 months after the fiscal year. Results are 
not sensitive to these different definitions of returns.
In our main tests we use earnings before extraordinary and special items. However, 
and following Pope and Walker (1999), we replicate our tests with bottom-line earnings, 
as managers might use extraordinary and special items differently in different
accounting regimes, especially to avoid capturing bad news in the profit and loss 
account through ordinary earnings. Using bottom-line earnings our results do not
change qualitatively.
We also use Fama and MacBeth (1973) mean annual regressions to avoid our results 
being driven by cross-sectional dependence problems. Although the results are similar 
to the ones reported with the pooled samples, we choose to report the pooled results 
as we have serious concerns about the robustness of mean annual regressions for our 
samples. The number of observations in the early years of most of our samples 
(especially the IAS ones) is very limited, which prevents running robust regressions. 
Having this in mind, for most of the samples (for example, for the matched German 
samples) we only have 7 years of data to run the Basu tests, which puts into question 
the assumption of normality of the parameters of Fama and MacBeth (1973). Also, and 
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as pointed out by Basu (1999), Fama and MacBeth regressions assume stationary 
parameters, and as we know, some of the accounting regimes under study have 
changed significantly over the last years. Thus, assuming that the parameters are 
stationary is questionable.
For our first set of tests (comparing the six groups of firms) we also control for
differences in the market to book ratio and size, as a first control for differences in 
economic characteristics and sample composition across the different groups. The 
results of these tests are consistent with prior research. As expected, firms with high 
market to book ratios (firms that understate more assets, with more balance sheet 
conservatism) are less conservative in earnings. Also, small firms are more earnings 
conservative than large firms. This is consistent with prior research, but relatively
surprising. Basu (2001) explains this surprising result on the grounds of smaller firms 
being riskier and facing larger litigation risk. García Lara et al. (2005) also argue that 
smaller firms in continental European countries engage more in income decreasing 
earnings management that increase the measures of earnings conservatism. Results 
of comparisons of conservatism between groups of firms using or not IAS across 
subsamples of size and the market to book ratio are consistent with the results 
described for the full sample.
Finally, and for the matched sample tests, we use several versions of the non-market
based variant of the Basu (1997) model proposed by Ball and Shivakumar (2005). The 
results of these tests (tests of persistence in earnings changes) are always consistent 
with IASB standards not increasing the measures of conservatism over the
conservatism shown by matched firms using local GAAP.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study we analyse whether the use of IASB standards affects the conservatism of 
earnings of the firms that adopt them. Using a matched sample of German firms that 
use local GAAP and IAS respectively, we show that the use of IASB standards has a 
very reduced effect over the earnings conservatism measures. In fact, the
conservatism of the two matched groups is not significantly different. This shows that 
institutional factors such as the reduced litigation risk in Germany, the more
pronounced smoothing of earnings, etc. will prevail and drive the attributes of earnings. 
Also, and in a more descriptive set of tests, we compare the conservatism of firms by 
groups of firms/countries using or not IAS. Our results show that the use of IAS in non-
European countries does not yield timely accounting numbers (untimely good and bad 
news recognition in earnings). In line with Ball et al. (2003), our opinion is that such 
countries (emerging countries) should improve their enforcement mechanisms.
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NOTES:
i
 See analytical demonstration in Zhang (2000, p. 132).
ii
 Being The Netherlands a distinctive case in between common-law and code-law based
countries.
iii
 Although if any, the effect of the use of IASB standards should be an increase in the earnings 
conservatism measures, due to a decrease in balance sheet conservatism that the use of IAS 
16 could introduce.
iv
 We extend the German sample to 2004 so that we have all available observations before
2005, as this is the year when IASB standards become compulsory for listed firms to prepare 
their consolidated financial statements in the European Union.
v
 Alford (1992) and Liu et al. (2002) show that, for valuation purposes, the best way to select 
comparable firms is by matching by industry sector, and that other more sophisticated matching 
techniques do not contribute to selecting a more comparable firm.
v i
 In a sensitivity test we replicate this analysis including The Netherlands in the code-law based 
group. The Netherlands can be considered as a hybrid accounting system in between code-law
and common-law systems. It is based on the microeconomic theory and although traditionally
considered as closer to common-law regimes (see Nobes, 1983), results from prior international 
studies on earnings conservatism for Dutch firms describe them as closer to code-law firms’ 
countries (see for example García Lara and Mora, 2004).
vii
 The b2 coefficient is, as expected, very close to zero. However, it is surprisingly negative. This 
is due to the existence of extreme observations that are not discarded with the typical outlier 
removal of the top and bottom percentile of each variable. We replicate this test removing more 
outliers (2%, 5%) and the β2 coefficient becomes positive.
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TABLE 1: Composition of total sample
Local-GAAP IAS
Country Classification Firms Observations Firms Observations
Australia Common-Law 376 2,035 3 5
Austria Code-Law 28 150 42 141
Belgium Code-Law 104 567 16 57
Canada Common-Law 468 3,472
France Code-Law 586 2,973 33 227
Germany Code-Law 341 1,664 263 746
Hong Kong Emerging 238 1,470 1
Italy Code-Law 163 672 85 372
Japan Code-Law 3,458 24,709
Malaysia Emerging 821 4,254 3 5
Netherlands ? 147 1,008 11 29
New Zealand Common-Law 66 322 1 4
Singapore Emerging 447 1,976 2 3
South Africa Common-Law 88 516 18 59
Spain Code-Law 132 802 2 6
Switzerland Code-Law 108 491 129 646
Taiwan Emerging 234 1,061
Thailand Emerging 361 2,051 1 4
United Kingdom Common-Law 1,145 6,889 4 9
United States Common-Law 2,746 21,970
Other countries (38) 260 737
TOTAL 12,057 79,052 874 3,050
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TABLE 2: Descriptive statistics: Total sample
Local-GAAP
Code-Law Common-Law Emerging
IAS
Xit
Mean 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.01
Median 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04
St. Deviation 0.11 0.19 0.34 0.23
Number Obs 31,415 34,664 10,663 2,998
Rit
Mean -0.01 0.16 0.10 0.13
Median -0.06 0.07 -0.03 0.05
St. Deviation 0.38 0.63 0.67 0.60
Number Obs 33,105 37,360 11,971 3,238
Notes:
For each firm i and fiscal year t, Xit denotes annual earnings per share before extraordinary 
items deflated by beginning of fiscal year price; Rit denotes security return over the fiscal year. 
The top and bottom percentiles of Xit and Rit are excluded, as well as observations with missing 
values.
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TABLE 3: Descriptive statistics: Matched samples of German firms using local GAAP and 
IASB standards
German GAAP IAS
Statistics
Xit Rit Xit Rit
Mean 0.00 0.08 -0.02 0.02
Median 0.05 0.03 0.04 -0.03
Max. 0.70 3.17 0.53 2.25
Min. -1.32 -0.79 -1.36 -0.87
St. Deviation 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.57
Number
Obs.
537 537
Notes:
For each firm i and fiscal year t, Xit is earnings before extraordinary and special items per share 
deflated by share price at the beginning of fiscal year, and Rit is the rate of return of the firm over 
the fiscal year, inclusive of dividends.
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TABLE 4: Comparison of earnings conservatism across groups of firms coming from 
different accounting regimes and using different accounting standards
Sample β0 β1 β2 β3 Adj. R
2 (%) N
Common-Law
0.05
(33.53)
-0.00
(-1.66)
-0.02
(-8.05)
0.30
(33.92)
9.54 33,927
Code-Law
0.04
(27.82)
-0.01
(-4.54)
0.03
(8.69)
0.08
(13.27)
6.31 30,817
Code-Law excluding 
Japan
0.06
(23.18)
-0.00
(-0.63)
0.01
(1.67)
0.24
(15.43)
13.02 6,828
Emerging countries
0.02
(4.05)
-0.03
(-3.18)
0.03
(2.81)
0.15
(6.91)
3.75 10,455
IAS
0.06
(8.49)
-0.00
(-0.18)
-0.00
(-0.01)
0.33
(10.06)
11.41 2,931
IAS-Europe
0.05
(6.28)
-0.01
(-0.42)
-0.02
(-1.11)
0.38
(9.80)
12.95 2,115
Notes:
Sample: Firms adopting IAS during the period 1994-2003 are aggregated into the ‘IAS’ sample. 
The ‘IAS-Europe’ subsample only includes firms from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, and Switzerland. 
Firms from countries adopting their domestic standards during the same period are included
into three benchmark accounting systems: (a) ‘Common-Law’ (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
South Africa, UK, and USA); (b) ‘Code-Law’ (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Spain, and Switzerland); and (c) ‘Emerging’ (Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
Thailand).
Model:
itititititit
RDRRRDX εββββ ++++=
3210
For each firm i and fiscal year t: Xit denotes annual earnings per share before extraordinary 
items deflated by beginning of fiscal year price; Rit denotes security return over the fiscal year; 
and RDit =1 if Rit<0 (market value decrease over the fiscal year) and =0 otherwise (market value 
increase).
N denotes the number of firm-year observations available for each accounting system. The first 
and 100
th
 percentiles of Xit and Rit are excluded.
Analysis: Statistics are from regressions using the pooled cross-section and time-series of firm-
year observations for each sample. Reported t-statistics between parentheses are White (1980) 
adjusted.
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TABLE 5: Comparative asymmetry in the contemporaneous association between 
earnings and returns before and after the IAS adoption
β2 β2D β3 β3D Adj. R
2 (%) N
European
countries
0.04
(2.47)
-0.06
(-2.41)
0.21
(4.18)
0.17
(2.78)
14.65 2,892
Other
Countries
-0.00
(-0.01)
0.04
(0.60)
0.25
(2.62)
-0.07
(-0.67)
6.45 1,349
Notes:
Sample: Firms adopting IAS during the period 1994-2003 are aggregated into two subsamples:
firms from 7 continental European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
and Switzerland), and firms from other countries.
Model:
ititititDititititD
itititDititDit
DIRDRRDRDIR
RDIRDRDDIX
εβββ
βββββ
++++
+++++=
332
21100
For each firm i and fiscal year t: Xit denotes annual earnings per share before extraordinary 
items deflated by beginning of fiscal year price, Rit denotes security return over the fiscal year;
RDit =1 if Rit<0 (market value decrease over the fiscal year) and =0 otherwise (market value 
increase); and DIit = 1 when accounting earnings is reported under the IAS and = 0 under
domestic GAAP.
N denotes the number of firm-year observations available. The first and 100
th
 percentiles of Xit
and Rit are excluded, as well as observations with missing values.
Analysis: Statistics are from regressions using the pooled cross-section and time-series of firm-
year observations for each subsample. Results are not reported for the intercepts. Reported t-
statistics in brackets follow White (1980).
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TABLE 6: Earnings conservatism: Matched samples (by year, industry and size) of 
German firms using local German GAAP and IASB standards.
Coefficients (t-statistics)
Earnings Measure (X it)
β0 β1 β2 β3
Adj.
R
2
%
N
Panel A: German GAAP
Income Before 
Extraordinary
 and Special Items
0.05
(2.74)
-0.04
(-1.23)
0.03
(0.89)
0.27
(3.32)
0.10 537
Net Income (Bottom-line)
0.05
(2.61)
-0.03
(-0.93)
0.06
(1.34)
0.26
(2.63)
0.11
535
Panel B: IASB standards
Income Before 
Extraordinary
 and Special Items
0.05
(2.88)
-0.02
(-0.75)
-0.02
(-0.45)
0.32
(4.47)
0.12 537
Net Income (Bottom-line)
0.05
(2.07)
-0.03
(-0.77)
-0.02
(-0.42)
0.37
(4.62)
0.12 535
Notes:
Sample: Firms from Germany adopting the IASB standards during the period 1994-2004 are 
matched (by year, industry and size) with German firms using their domestic standards 
(German GAAP). 
Model:
itititititit
RDRRRDX εββββ ++++=
3210
For each firm i and fiscal year t: Xit denotes annual earnings per share deflated by beginning 
of fiscal year price; Rit denotes security return over the fiscal year; and RDit =1 if Rit<=0
(market value decrease over the fiscal year) and 0 otherwise (market value increase). N
denotes the number of firm-year observations available.
The reported t-statistics are based on Huber-White standard errors, which are robust to
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (Rogers, 1993).
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TABLE 7: Earnings conservatism: Matched samples (by year, industry and size) of German firms using local German GAAP and IASB standards.
Coefficients (t-statistics)
Earnings Measure (X it)
β0 β0D β1 β1D β2 β2D β3 β3D
Adj.
R
2
%
N
Income Before 
Extraordinary and Special 
Items
0.05
(2.74)
0.01
(0.29)
-0.04
(1.23)
0.02
(0.35)
0.03
(0.89)
-0.05
(-0.87)
0.27
(3.32)
0.06
(0.51)
0.11 1,074
Net Income (Bottom-line)
0.05
(2.61)
0.00
(-0.15)
-0.03
(-0.93)
0.01
(0.11)
0.06
(1.34)
-0.08
(-1.19)
0.26
(2.63)
0.11
(0.90)
0.12 1,070
Notes:
Sample: Firms from Germany adopting the IASB standards during the period 1994-2004 are matched (by year, industry and size) with German 
firms using their domestic standards (German GAAP).
Model:
ititititDititititD
itititDititDit
DIRDRRDRDIR
RDIRDRDDIX
εβββ
βββββ
++++
+++++=
332
21100
Where
                      Xit is earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the period,
Rit is the rate of return of the firm over the fiscal year inclusive of dividends,
RDit is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the case of bad news (negative or zero returns) and 0 in the case of good news,
DIit is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when firm i uses IAS and 0 when firm i uses German GAAP,
N is the number of observations.
The reported t-statistics are based on Huber-White standard errors, which are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (Rogers, 1993)
